e_jo_m | Entries tagged with ethics

I don't think that terminal values can be characterised as rational or irrational.

Instrumental values are often irrational, if it isn't the best way to achieve my terminal value. For example, if you value a certain internship because you want to get a certain job, that might be irrational if you have reason to believe that you can just as probably get the job without the dang internship.

But if you, say, like eating tasty foods, just 'cause you like it, that cannot be rational or irrational. The binary simply doesn't apply. It's like asking whether a brick is living or dead. It's like asking whether an apple is rational or irrational.

Terminal values can conflict with each other! If you enjoy eating tasty foods, but also enjoy not having cavities, then maybe you will refrain from eating tasty foods because your enjoyment of cavity-free chompers is a stronger terminal value which prevails over the weaker value of tasty food. That doesn't mean that the weaker terminal value is irrational.

The English language says that (usually) 'freedom' is when you're not oppressed by any agent. The Nussbaum acolytes argue that true freedom is when you have lots of choices and capabilities.

I think it's poor English to say that 'freedom' is capabilitarianism. But it is definitely true that there's little or no meaningful difference between being unable to speak out against the government because the free press is illegal versus being unable to speak out against the government because you can't afford a printing press. (For policy reasons, you may want to draw a distinction between the two; they aren't completely the same thing. But just as easily, for policy reasons, you can draw a distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, or between neutrally chosen Congressional districts, even though those distinctions are wholly artificial and arbitrary.)

The English language is misleading in that it has a big important word 'freedom', acting as though it represents all kinds of true freedom, when really it just represents a very narrow kind of liberty, ie the negative liberty of being free from active oppression by intelligent agents. But, given that this unhappy state of affairs is a part of the English language, it is also misleading to blithely use the word 'freedom' to mean all kinds of true freedom ie capability. This is an unfortunate situation, and one of many examples of you being under a responsibility to handicap yourself because life isn't fair. If you do want to use the word 'freedom' to mean all kinds of true freedom (ie, capability), you at least gotta be real up-front about it, and state clearly that you're using the word in a less common sense. (And even then, I suspect that it might be a little bit of a questionably honest rhetorical trick.)

"For the greater good" and "Love the sinner, hate the sin" and "You can't make an omelette without breaking a few eggs" are not only good things, but morally necessary things, the only correct thing to believe. But a ton of people think they're evil, because bad actors use the phrases to convince others that their bad actions are good. This is really unfortunate!

Mainstream society causes there to be a commonly held default expectation in many situations. For example, if someone walking up to you on the Tube says "Excuse me", you assume that they're asking to move past you. For example, if someone says "Can I help you with that?", you assume that they are not merely wondering out of curiosity, but further offering to do so if possible. For example, if someone kisses you on the lips, you assume that they mean it romantically and/or sexually. For example, if someone hands you a shinily wrapped box on your birthday while saying "Happy birthday", you assume that they will permit you to keep it as your own possession for the rest of your life. The thing about these assumptions is that they are positive statements which are imputed, presumed, filled in by society at large, even though you never say them. When I say "Please pass the salt", the other person will interpret that as including an invisible "to me".

This phenomenon is overall pretty useful. It would be practically impossible to operate in a society if we had to be certain about what someone meant, on the sole basis of only what they explicitly stated. I don't want to have to activate my contract-drafting skills every time I say "How do you turn on this blender?"

Now, the trouble is, sometimes you might feel that a given default expectation is stupid and unfair. For example, you might think it's ridiculous to just assume that just because you have a long-term committed romantic relationship with someone, then you have to ask their permission before you have sex with someone totally different who has nothing to do with them. And, well, often you'll be right. For example, the expectation that when you say "I'm not into guys" then there's an invisible "I'm into girls" is stupid and unfair. However, that doesn't always excuse taking advantage of the default expectation to deceive and mislead persons without technically lying, because it's often immoral to deceive and mislead persons even if the sole reason for their misapprehension is their own blind internalization of a moronic and unfair societal norm.

Random Citizen: "The government should have harsh penalties for crimes, so average citizens can exult in the suffering of the unrighteous."

Amateur Consequentialist: "Piffle! Prison sentences should be legally mandated only if they actually accomplish something besides suffering, like deterrence or rehabilitation."

Satan N'leve: "And they do accomplish something! Namely, the happiness of the average citizens, via their exultation in the suffering of the unrighteous. Aren't you a utilitarian?"

Respondeo dicendum quod: "There are two utilitarian objections to that.

"First, it is highly unlikely that the amount of happiness gained by the average victim outweighs the suffering generated by a twenty-year prison sentence. Victims aren't waking up every morning and thinking to themselves, 'Gee, it sure feels great that that bank robber is rotting in jail right now.'"

Satan N'leve: "That just means that retributivism should be a relatively small factor in determining sentencing, not a zero one."

Respondeo dicendum quod: "True, but the second consequentialist objection reduces the desired weight to zero.

"Sadism is a really bad psychological habit for a population to be in. We should not be spending any resources facilitating a habit of sadism! We should not inculcate, abide, and abet a cultural value of sadism! Same reason I don't think that the government should sponsor events where citizens burn effigies of racial minorities to music and chants. We'd be better off using tax dollars to give victims chocolate bars, because subsidizing chocolate is healthier for the population than subsidizing sadism!"

Satan N'leve: "Do you really think that, if funding longer prison sentences isn't an option, the Tory government will divert the saved money to a pro-social programme like that?"

Respondeo dicendum quod: "They might lower taxes! Great! Better than our culture promoting sadism!"

Satan N'leve: "You're denying victims part of their compensation for the sake of population-level PR?"

Respondeo dicendum quod: "Actually, yes. Promoting cultural norms is a great and vital weapon in the arsenal of Good (just as it is for Evil)."

Satan N'leve: "What do you think of the justification of penal law that says it's society's way of expressing disapproval?"

Respondeo dicendum quod: "Well, okay, I have to admit that it is a theoretically solid justification – solely because the desire for social conformity can actually reduce crime! – but not effective enough a reduction to justify most penal sentences; it is a too weak justification for most penal law in our country."

Random Citizen: "But it's morally important that bad persons be punished!"

Respondeo dicendum quod: "Please talk to Amateur Consequentialist."

Epistemic status: Might not even be internally consistent.

Any littering is bad, so I don't litter. But why do I do things that have no impact unless tons of persons do it? I vote for President, I turn off the water while I brush my teeth even when an institution is paying the water bill, I put scrap paper into the recycling bin, and so on. Such actions have a couple benefits:

- If I ever want to convince someone to do it, it's easier if I'm also doing it. (I guess I could wait until that exact moment to make a pact with them – "I'll do it if you will" – but who cares.)

- If people see me doing it, it seems more normal and societally expected of them.

- Virtue signaling.

"But Jo, but Jo! Haven't you stolen a tiny piece of the Berlin Wall from a museum?"

If everyone starts doing that, I'll return my piece.

"Haven't you walked on the back lawn of Queens' College?"

If everyone starts doing that, I'll stop.

"Haven't you checked out a very demanded book from the library?"

I returned it as soon as I'd finished reading it, and I attained my priority in checking it out via the equally applied library procedure (which in this case was simply requesting it early).

"Haven't you visited a national park?"

If everyone were doing that, I wouldn't – and in fact probably wouldn't be able to, because one hopes the Forest Service would put a cap on visiting (if they haven't already).

"Haven't you entered Classroom B at 11:14 on Tuesday the Sixteenth of March 2019?"

If everyone were doing that, I wouldn't. Thanks for such a friendly PoI.

"Happy to help. But let's go in a different direction. You vote, because if a few million people do the same, that might tip the election. But you don't boycott Coca-Cola, even though if a few million people did that then that might make them use more humane practices."

Hm. Maybe I firmly avoid doing negative harmful-only-in-aggregate acts iff other persons are doing them; and I will sometimes, to be a nice guy and a proper young lady, elect to do positive helpful-only-in-aggregate acts whether or not other persons are doing them; and if tons of other persons are doing helpful-only-in-aggregate acts, then I'm even more likely to do them. (There is no objective ethical difference between a positive act and an omission, but in my life I recognize a difference between the two simply as a matter of practical morality.)

An action that's kindhearted is not necessarily the same thing as an action that's good for the world; if you want to call kindhearted actions 'morality', fine, just don't confuse it with actions we want to happen.

(tw: the obvious)

I don't always approve of allowing people control over their own bodies, but I think it's awful bad when someone suffers a fate worse than death. So unless legalised regulated suicide is so staggeringly corrupt that literally 51% of its ostensible users are just straight-up being plain murdered under the guise of their falsely alleged consent, then I think we oughta let people elect to withdraw from the mortal realm if they really want to.